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Thispaper investigates the quantitative implications of two business cycle models in
which aggregate fluctuationsarisein response to variationsin theprocessof financial
intermediation. In the first, fundamental shocks in the capital accumulationprocess lead to
fluctuations in the real returns from intermediated investment. For thiseconomy, we find that
the correlations produced are not consistent with observations of the U.S.economy. In particular,
consumption is not smoother than output, investment is negatively correlated with output,
variations in the capital stock are quite large and interest rates are procycical. In aneconomy
with both intermediation and total factor productivity shocks, the correlations we produceare
closer to those observed in the U.S. economy only when the intermediation shock is relatively
unimportant.
In the second economy, variations in the returns to intermediation are part of asunspot
equilibrium. Fluctuations here are driven by self-fulfilling beliefs by private agents regarding the
returns to intermediation as in an economy beset by banking crises. For this non-linear economy,
we find that the correlations are closer to those observed but the variability of capital relative to
outputis stilltoo large.
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I. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to understand the quantitative implications of models hi
which shocks to the financial intermediation process generate aggregate fluctuations. Our
interest in this exercise stems from recent theoretical advances concerning the role of
financial intermediation as both a source of aggregate fluctuations and a vehicle for their
propagation and magnification.
In an important contribution to this literature, Bernanke [1983] studies the interwar
years and finds that the post-1930 financial crisis is key to understanding the depth and
length of the U.S. Great Depression. We argues that banbuptcies and bank runs disrupted
the links between savings and investment and that this increased cost of intermediation
propagated the initial downturn in real economic activity. In a related vein, Hamilton [1987J
argues that contractionary monetary policy in the late 1920's led to unanticipated deflation
which, operating through balance sheet effects, disrupted the process of financial
intermediation after 1930. Again the emphasis of the analysis is on the increased costs of
intermediation as a basis for the prolonged depression in economic activity.
Building upon these observations, theoretical models have been constructed to study
the interaction between financial intermediation and real economic activity operating through
the structure of lending arrangements.' Empirical work on the importance of balance sheet
effects has complemented these theoretical developments. Our purpose here is to understand
the implications of these models for key aggregate correlations.
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Todo so, we consider two models which have a common ingredient: fluctuations are
associated with variations in the costs of intermediation. In the first, fluctuations in the
economy axe a consequence of shocks to the process of intermediation. To construct such a
model, we build upon the framework of King, Plosser and Rebelo [1988] and introduce
disturbances into the intertemporal production process that creates capital from investment.
We interpret these as intermediation shocks reflecting variations in the processes of matching
savings and investment, project evaluation and project monitoring.2 While this structure does
not have the richness of the contracting models that have been constructed to analyze
incentive problems and balance sheet effects, this is a useful first step in determining whether
the broad class of models encompassed in this framework have quantitative implications that
broadly match observations of the aggregate economy. In particular, the specification is
consistent with the arguments of Bernanke [1983] that variations in the real costs of
intermediation lie at the heart of financial crises underlying the propagation of the Great
Depression.
On this score, we find that the model with intermediation shocks fails to match a
number of key macroeconomic observations. First, these shocks produce a negative
correlation between consumption and investment. In times of productive intermediation,
consumption is reduced and investment increased in an effort to build up the capital stock.
In many ways, shocks to the intermediation process operate as taste shocks, as in the work of
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Baxterand King [1991], in that they lead to negative comovements in consumption and
investment. Second, the volatility of the capital stock relative to output is unreasonably
large. Finally, the real interest rate is procycical, contnry to the evidence provided by
Beaudry and Quay [1992]. Thus the view that intermediation shocks are the only source of
fluctuations seems inconsistent with the broad characteristics of aggregate fluctuations.
Economies in which there axe multiple sources of fluctuations, including intermediation
shocks, match observations better if the intermediation shocks are of secondard importance.
A second model, built upon the theoretical models of Bryant [1987] and Well [1989],
also stresses financial fragility as a source of fluctuations. In contrast to the first class of
economies, there are no fundamental shocks to the process of intermediation. Instead,
fluctuations emerge from extrinsic uncertainty regarding the returns to saving and investment.
To model this, we examine an infinite horizon economy with capital accumulation and use
the arguments of Bryant and Weil to construct sunspot equilibria in the neighborhood of the
multiple steady state equilibria.' The multiplicity, in turn, reflects a strategic
complementarity in the intermediation process. The model is intended to capture the banking
instability that was prevalent during the Depression period.' Our model allows us to
evaluate modeis of financial instability due to variations in investor confidence by focusing
on the processes of capital accumulation, output, investment, consumption and employment.
The economy exhibits fluctuations induced by sunspots that mimic certain features of
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U.S.data. In particular, output, employment, consumption and investment are all positively
correlated. In addition, these fluctuations are persistent. Further, the net return on savings,
which would correspond to the deposit rate in a decentralized setting, is counter-cyclical.
This is an important feature of the model. Though times in which savings is put into
intermediaries yields high marginal returns, the average returns (which the deposit rates
reflect) are less responsive due to the nonlinear return stream. Consequently, for some
parameterizations the model produces the pattern of counter-cyclical real interest rates
observed duringtheGreat Depression.3 A second aspect of the behavior of interest rates
duringthisperiod is the dramaticallyincreasedgap that arose between theyieldoncorporate
debtandgovernment debt, reflecting perhaps a desire for liquidity and safety by investors.'
We illustrate how our model accounts for this gap.
These results do appear though to require relatively large fluctuations in the stock of
capital. In particular, the variance of the capital stock is often four times more than that of
real output. Given this, the pattern of correlations produced by the model mimics the
correlation pattern found along the transition path of the neoclassical growth model.
Intuitively this makes sense since a relatively permanent shock to the intermediation process
leads to the accumulation (deaccumulation) of capital as the economy heads back to the
steady state associated with the current intermediation shock.7
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H.Stochastic Capital Accumulation
(i) Basic Model
In thissectionof the paper we evaluate a model in which the accumulationof capita]
is stochastic.Whilethemodeldoes notincludeany particularfonnalizatjon of the
intermediationprocess, it encompasses a variety ofsuch models.
In theincentivebasedtheories of intermediation, studied byBernanke andGertler
[1989] among others, variations in the wealth of borrowers influences thecosts of borrowing
and lending. These costs of intermediation reflect the need to monitor theactivity of
borrowers. Bernanke and (Jertler [1989] specify a capital accumulationprocess of
(1)
so that the capital stock in period t+1depends on period tinvestment(iJ times the return per
unit investment. This return includes a constant xlessthe costs of monitoring in period t,
h17.Thus in their model, variations in costs of capital accumulation reflect fluctuationsin
the frequency of monitoring a representative project captured by h. Much of theiranalysis
is then concerned with the determination of this probability. Our formulationstudies the
same accumulation process but views the returns to intermediation as anexogenous stochastic
process. Bernanke [1983] provides further discussion of this point that variations in the real
costs of intermediation underlie aggregate fluctuations.
Alternatively, the model represents shocks to the process of intermediation. Further,
variations in financial regulations, such as the enforcement of capital requirementsor reserve
requirements, will directly influence the real costs of intermediation independently ofany
incentive problems underlying the structure of intermediaries. A convenient representation of6
this is to assume that the cost, in terms of current consumption foregone, of obtaining a
given amount of capital in the future is stochastic.
To be more precise, consider an economy in which a representative agent lives
forever.' Utility over consumption (c.) and leisure (I.) in period t is given by U(c,,lJ, which
is assumed to be strictly increasing and quasi-concave. Assume that intertemporal
preferences are given by E7..1 fi' U(c,L), where $E(O,l) is the discount rate.
The individual faces three constraints. The first is a time constraint that labor input
(it)plusleisure time cannot exceed the time endowment: ;+ I, ￿ 1. The second constraint
requires that total output plus the undepreciated capital is either consumed or invested, i.e.
c+= A,F(K,,n)+(1—6)4 (2)
where Se(O,l) is the rate of capital depreciation, ç is the period t level of consumption and
I, is the period t level of investment. In this constraint, the production function detennines
total output (y1) from the inputs of labor, capital (K) and a stochastic production parameter
that is common to alt agents, A,. We assume that F(K,n) is strictly increasing in both of its
arguments and is strictly concave. The third constraint is that the capital stock evolves
according to
=JO,
In this accumulation equation, 0, is the shock to the intermediation process that is the focus
of this exercise. Note that the specification of the accumulation process reflects a putty-putty
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viewof capital.Ineach period, undepreciated capital and the current flow of output are
identical so that the capital stock for the following period must come from investment today
and hence is subject to intennediadon shocks. Further, the timing is such that the shocks to
intermediation are known at the time of investment. Alternative specifications might imply
that only current investment flows are influenced by the state of the intermediation process
and/or would require the agent to make choices prior to knowing the returns on investment.9
Substitution of the constraints leads the representative household to choose
{ç,n1,K,LJ7_0 to maximize S, ffu(ç,nJ subject to (2) and (3). The first-order conditions
from this problem, given a sequence of shocks (A1, OJ are given by:
u/c1-n)/_'= AF(K,n) (4)
Uc.,C,.
u(c,, 1—n) = u(c,,1, 1—n,41) [A,41F1(X,11n,41)+(l—ô)]6, (5)
= A,F(K0n) (6)
Ouranalysis ofthis system follows King,Plosser and Rebelo [1988]. This involves
the log linearization of these conditions around the steady state using a certainty equivalence
approach so that future (random) variables are replaced by their conditional expectation. The
functional forms used in this approximation, again following King, Plosser and Rebelo,
ensure that the low frequency observations of the economy are consistent with observations
on per capita hours and real interest rates. We assume that U(c,l)=log(c) + ulog(l) and
Thu...scM tucSon of themodel I. tosiam.. diii onlycu,rergadditions tothe c.pitd mock anputthroughtheintermediation
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that the production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale: y, =
(ii) Calibration
The parameterization of the economy is quite standard and again follows King,
Plosser and Rebelo [1988] to facilitate a comparison of results. Labor's share in national
income is used to calibrate the production function: i.e. 1-a=.65." The parameter u in the
utility function is set so that the avenge amount of time allocated to work is .2. As in King,
Plosser and Rebelo, the annual rate of depreciation is set at 10% and discount rate is set so
that the steady state real rate of return is 6.5%.
There are two parameters that we add to this model: the standard deviation and serial
correlation of the intermediation shock. At this point, the standard deviation of the
intermediation shockisset at the same level as the total factor productivity shock in King,
Plosser and Rebelo)2 Since our interest is in understanding the pattern of correlations
produced by this type of disturbance, the magnitude of its standard deviation is not critical.
The serial correlation of the intermediation shock is used as a treatment variable.
(iii) Results
In evaluating this economy, our goal is to obtain a better understanding of the
workings of the theoretical model. We summarize the behavior of the economy through a
variety of moments and impulse response functions. In addition, we compare the model
•Is cofl, Orecawood, Ncrcowt and Hstben119*11named that U(c,a)*O(o))wbsn i.()Isricdy iacre.ing .5 zicdy
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economyagainst important features of U.S.data, such asthe cross-correlations of
consumption, investment, employment and output and the standard deviation of the capital
stock relative to output. We take the statistics for U.S. data reported in King, Plosser and
Rebelo (1988] as our benchmark. Note though, as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Ruffman
[1988], that the capital stock series derived for the U.S. is not consistent with a model
emphasizing shocks to the accumulation process.'3
The quantitative aspects of this economy are summarized in Tables 1-2 and Figure 1.
The rows of Tables 1 and 2 correspond to two treatments. The first is the traditional real
business cycle model in which fluctuations are due to total factor productivity (TFP) shocks.
The second row corresponds to the case of iid intermediation (TNT) shocks. For Table 1 the
shocks are assumed to be serially uncorrelated while for Table 2 the shocks were assumed to
have serial correlation of .9 The columns of this table represent various statistics for key
macroeconomic variables computed for our model economy.
As is well understood, the real business cycle model with lid shocks (see the first row
of Table 1) corresponds in some but not all ways to observations of U.S. data. In particular,
consumption smoothing is quite apparent as is the fact that investment is more volatile than
output. Further, employment, consumption, investment and productivity are all positively
correlated with output. Note though, from the first row of Table 1, that the standard model
has little endogenous propagation of shocks since the serial correlation in output is quite
small.
The treatment with intermediation shockc, reported in the second row of Table 1, is
"Wedeal withthis mea.jre.nes isaje in our .econdecoaomy by creating • capital mock attic. s. meawr.4 in cutnnz U.S. dai, from
our simulations.10
quite different andinmany cases inconsistent with observation. Here we see that there is
substantial serial correlation in output of .75 even thoughthe intermediationshocks are
serially uncorrelated. The endogenous propagation is a consequence of substantial
movements in the capital stock. For this treatment, the standard deviation in the capital
stock is about five times that of output. In contrast, for the case of serially uncorrelated
technology shocks, the capital stock is about one third as volatile as output. For the post-
War U.S. economy, the capital stock, as currently measured, has a standard deviation about
of that for output.
Theintermediationshock treatment also produces some counterfactual implications for
the behaviorof consumptionand investment. In particular,while consumptionispositively
correlatedwithoutput, investment and employment are negatively correlated with output. In
fact, the correlation between consumption and investment for this treatment is -.89. Further,
there is no evidence of consumption smoothing here in that both consumption and investment
are more volatile than output. Finally, the real interest rate (i.e. the real return on equity) in
this economy is highly procyclical in contrast to observation.'4
To better understand the behavior of this economy, Figure 1 presents the impulse
response to a temporaiy intermediation shock that increases the return on investment by 1
percentage point. Here we see that the increased return to intermediation creates a burst of
investment at impact. This investment is 'fmanced in two ways. First, there is an increase
in overall economic activity as output goes above its steady state. Second, consumption falls
S.. Bea.&dq sad Gi.ay119921for a di.cusaion of lb. cyclicalp,vpcnie. ofcan nit. relative to the implications of ttal busiocu
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below its steady state level. In subsequent periods, the neoclassical adjustment process takes
over starting from a value of the capital stock thatisnow above its steady state. Along this
path, which is detailed in King, Plosser and Rebelo [1988], investment is below steady state
since the capital stock is falling over time. Output and consumption though are above steady
state since the stockofcapital provides an opportunity to produce more output. Finally,
employment islessthan its steady state level reflecting both wealth effects and the relatively
low real interest rates (due to the large accumulation of capital) along the transition path.
The correlations reported in Table 1 for the intermediation shock treatment reflect
both the response of the economy to an intermediation shock and the comovements produced
by the transitional dynamics. In particular, the negative correlation between investment and
output, as well as that reported between employment and output, reflect the transition path.
Table 2 considers the case in which the technology and intermediation shocks are
serially correlated. For the standard real business cycle (TFP shock treatment), we see many
basicfeaturesof the business cycle emerge In contrast with Table 1, the model also exhibits
substantial serial correlationinoutput due to the correlated technology stocks.
From the second row of Table 2, in response the serially correlated intermediation
shocks, consumption smoothing is still not evident in that consumption is more volatile than
output. Further, investment is slightly negatively correlated with output and remains
negatively correlated with consumption.15 Finally, as in the case of uncorrelated shocks,
employment remains negatively correlated with output.
Onemightthinkthat thu I. • consequence o(thc amount oft ,i.'. correlation In the iteimediation .hock sinceapermanent shock
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(iv)Additionaltreatments
Thus far, our results indicate that intermediation shocks alone produce a negative
correlation between consumption and investment arid create excessive volatility of the capital
stock relative to output.Whilewe have not undertaken a complete comparison of the model
with U.S. data, these two features of the model are clearly at odds with observed time series.
Given that, we consider variations on the model to deal with these problems. These
variations are of interest as well as they illuminate some additional properties of an economy
with intermediation shocks.
As discussed by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988], this first property is an
almost immediate implication of the model as long as consumption and leisure are normal
goods: shockc to the returns to one activity (investment) create an incentive to substitute
away from another (consumption). Their solution to this problem was to allow for
variations in the utilization rate of the capital stock so that output could respond to increased
returns to investment and consumption would then increase as well. As discussed below,
ours is to allow for a form of social returns to scale, advocated by Bryant [1983] and brought
into quantitative macroeconomics by Baxter and King [1991].
As for the excessive volatility of the capital stock relative to output, consider the
production function (the variables are all in logs):
=a1+ak+(l-c)n,.
In the absence of variations in total factor productivity and holding labor supply fixed, the
standard deviation of output must be less than the standard deviation of capital. If labor
varies and has a positive covariance with capital, then it might be possible to have the13
standarddeviation of output exceed that of capital.In fact, thecovariance of laborand
capitalwas negative forthe treatment with lid tNT shocks.
There areanumber ofadditionaltreatments ofthismodel which mightbringthe
implicationsclosertoobservations. In particular, are there variations in parametersand/or
the stochastic processwhich mightproduceapositive correlation between consumptionand
investment andreduce thevariance of the capital stock?
First, one might consider a pararneterization in which labor supply is more elastic
than the case explored thus far. This is particularly relevant for reducing the relative
standard deviation of the capital stock. To explore this, we considered our baseline
treatment with an iid intermediation shock in which labor supply was infinitely elastic. The
lid case was chosen since this would create the most intertemporal substitution. The results
of this exercise were: (i) the capital stock was still more volatile than output and (ii)
consumption and investment were negatively correlated.
A second alteration to our model, motivated by Baxter and King [1991], is to
introduce a production externality into the specification of the technology for the
representative agent." In particular, suppose the agent's production function is given by:
-
whereVrepresentsthe average level of output in the economy in period t and y
parameterizes the extent of the externality. A conservative estimate ofis .23, as discussed
by Baxter and King [1991). Using this specification of technology and this estimateof',the
Nash equilibrium of the dynamic economy is characterized by a system of first order
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conditions, not unlike those stated above, derived from the optimization of a single agent
taking the evolution of the aggregate output measure as given. These conditions are then
linearized and the moment implications of the model are determined. This procedure is
discussed in detail by Baxter and King [1991].
The relevance of this exercise relates to the relationship between our model of
intermediation shocks and a model with taste shocks. Baxter and King argue that in the
presence of a production externality, shocks to the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure can produce fluctuations that have many business cycle
characteristics, including consumption smoothing and the positive comovement of
consumption and investment with output. The role of the externality is clear: without this
effect, taste shocks produce a negative correlation between consumption and investment and
consumption smoothing is not evident. Through the externality, the increased activity
resulting from the intermediation shocks creates an endogenous increase in total factor
productivity for the individual producer and this leads to an increased production of
consumption goods." Thus one might conjecture that introducing production externalities
into the model of intermediation shocks might have similar effects to the extent that the
intermediation shock is acting like an intertemporal taste shock.
Our results indicate that for y=.23, the economy with the production externality and
serially correlated intermediation shocks continues to exhibit negative correlation between
consumption and investment and the capital stock is still more volatile than output. Raising
°Oreenwood H.rcowitz and Huffima1198S1allow (or variable wIizatio. of capital as eodogcnou. depreciation. In their n.odcI.
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theproduction externality above this level (y=.375) combined with infinitely elastic labor
supply implies that consumption is smoother than output and consumption, investment and
labor productivity are all positively correlated with output." Still, the standard deviation of
capital to output is about 1.5,wellabove that observed in U.S. data.
Third, we consider a setting in which both real and intermediation shocks exiSt.
Since the model with productivity shocks alone has some desirable characteristics
(consumption smoothing and capital less volatile than output) it is not surprising that an
economy with both productivity and intermediation shocks can produce these effecLs simply
by appropriate parameterization of these two sources of uncertainty. The issue, of course, is
to evaluate the behavior of the economy for the actual relative standard deviations and
variance/covaflajce matrix for these shocks. Oe approach then is to identify the
intermediation shocks from the Euler equation. The other, which we pursue here, is to
provide some idea about the relative importance of the shocks such that the model has certain
properties.
In particular, consider a version of our baseline economy in which both real and
intermediation shocks coexist and are, by assumption, uncorrelated. Assume further that
both sources of fluctuation have a serial correlation coefficient of .9. Given this stnicture,
we searched over the standard deviation of the intermediation shock relative to that of total
factor productivity to determine when the correlation of consumption and investment was
zero and when the standard deviation of the capital stock was about equal to that of output.
The results are quite surprising. If the standard deviation of the intermediation shock is 3%
"Evea for hi. high v.1st of y, the e.dy MateI.Mill uddlc-p.thMabM. Sec thedinuio. im Fanner and Gt.o t19931about the
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ofthe total factor productivity shock, then the correlation between consumption and
investment is nearly zero. For larger relative values of the standard deviation of the
intermediation shock, the correlation of consumption and investment is negative. Further,
the standard deviation of the intermediation shock must be reduced to .5% of the standard
deviation of the total factor productivity shock before the standard deviation of the capital
stock nearly equals that of output. This exercise suggests that a mixed model can indeed
bring the model's implications for the standard deviation of capital relative to output and the
correlation between consumption and investment closer to observation but that this requires a
parameterization with an extremely small role for the intermediation shock.
Alternatively,asdescribed by Bernanke and Gertler [1989], perhaps the
intermediation shocks as modeled here actually follow productivity shocks instead of being
independent. For example, an initial productivity decline reduces the wealth of borrowers
and thus reduces the productivity of the intermediation process. Thus, initial productivity
shocks are propagated through the intermediation process. Thus, we experimented with an
economy in which a temporary technology shock is positively correlated with a serially
correlated intermediation shock. The issue, once again, is the magnitude of the link between
the productivity shock and the resulting intermediation shock.
To study this issue, we parameterized the response of the intermediation shock to the
iid productivity shock and then computed the correlation between consumption and
investment as well as the standard deviation of the capital stock relative to output. We found
that if a 1% innovation to total factor productivity was followed by a .05% innovation to the
intermediation shock, the capita] stock was slightly more volatile than output and the17
correlationbetween consumption and investment was negative. One could of course reduce
the relative innovation to the intermediation variable further but the point is clear: only when
the innovation to intermediation induced by a real shock is quite small will the predictions of
the model match up with observation.
(v)Summary
Insummary, our first model attempts to capture the spirit of awide rangeof models
inwhich aggregate fluctuations are associated with variability in the intermediationprocess.
In our analysis, we thus consider the impact of shocks to the accumulation process on the
aggregate economy. These shocks represent variations in the cost today of acquiring a given
level of capital in the following period. We see that the types of correlations produced by
this model are at variance with basic features of economic fluctuations. In particular,
consumption and investment are often negatively correlated, the capital stock is quite volatile
relative to output and real interest rates are procycical. The model with social increasing
returns remedies some of these problems if the production externality is sufficiently large.
At an extreme, these results indicate that a model of the intermediation process in
which variations in the costs of accumulation are a lcey component is likely to produce
correlations that are inconsistent with basic features of aggregate data. In particular,
intermediation shocks alone seem to produce correlations at variance with observations on the
U.S. economy. Further, the mixed models do better only when the intermediation effects are
of secondary importance.
ifi. A Model of Financial Fragility
In this section of the paper we consider a model in which fluctuations reflect strategicIs
uncertainty with regard to the returns to intermediation. Relative to the experience of the
U.S. economy during the Depression period, our model is intended to represent the strategic
uncertainty underlying many accounts of financial crises. The model relies on a thick
markets externality such that the returns to participating in financial markets increases with
the level of activity in that market. Thus the model captures, in an extreme way, the
breakdownofthe intermediation process (bank failures and depositors search for liquidity
and safety) during the Depression period.'9
The economy we construct is an infinite horizon version of the two period models
considered by Bryant and Well. In those models, two period lived agents made a savings
decision where the return to savings was an increasing function of the overall level of
savings. As shown by Bryant and Weil, this form of social returns to scale can lead to
multiple equilibria of the game played by the savers. In our formulation this returns to scale
is modeled through an assumption of a fixed cost to the process of intermediation, reflecting
the processes of loan evaluation, monitoring, outstanding obligations of the intermediary and
other transactions costs. Diamond [1984] argues that a key role of intermediaries is to
efficiently monitor the behavior of borrowers. Our model assumes that agents who join the
intermediary share in the fixed cost of its operation. This fixed cost creates a participation
externality (a form of strategic complementarity, emphasized by Cooper and John [1988])
which underlies the multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, the avenge savings level is low
so that the representative agent chooses to save little reflecting the low return. This savings
is associated with non-intermediated investment, which may include flows to the government
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andfirms with high credit ratings. In the other equilibrium, the avenge saving level is high
and the resulting high returns promote high savings by the individuals as well as an active
process of intermediation.
Our economy differs from the papers by Bryant and Well in two ways. First, we
represent this interaction across savers in an infinite horizon economy so that this "savings
gainC is played eachperiod. Second, we assume that the resolution ofthestrategic
uncertainty can be represented through a sunspot process. That is, there is assumed to be a
correlation device that determines the outcome of the 'savings game" in each period. Our
focus is on the dynamiós induced by the capital aotumulation process in the presence of
extrinsic uncertainty.20
This model captures a key element of financial fragility found in the models of Bryant
and Weil as well as the bank run models of Diamond and Dybvig [1983]. Profitable
intermediated activities requires the participation of others who share confidence in the
viability of the intermediaries.2' This confidence leads agent to deposit resources in these
institutions (Bryant and Weil) and to leave them there (i.e. to avoid the runs stressed by
Diamond and Dybvig).
The approach outlined for the previous model of linearizing around a steady state is
not sufficient here due to the presence of the nonlinearities induced by the sunspot variables.
So, we model this dynamic economy by determining the policy function of a representative
agent assuming that the set of agents is in a symmetric Nash equilibrium (induced by the
'mc dynamic. an thus snoci.tcd with fluctuation. in the neighbod,ood of the Iwo ne.dy nil.. of the infinitely rtpc.1e4 rage pm..
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extrinsic uncertainty) in each period. The policy function, in turn, is determined from a
value function iteration procedure. More formally, consider the following dynamic
programming problem for a representative agent:





In this problem, the current state for the representative agent is given by the current capital
stock (K) and the state of the sunspotvariable(0). Given these state variables, the
representative agent chooses a level of work (n) and the capital stock for the next period
(K'). The current consumption level is determined by the total resources available from both
current production and the undepreciated capital stock less the investment level, I(K',D). The
key to the dynamic programming problem is this investment function?2
In keeping with the spirit of Bryant and Well, the intermediation process can be in
one of two states: i.e. DE {O, Oj where 8 represents optimism and 0 is the state of
pessimism. When optimism occurs, each agrit believes that other will save through the
intermediary so that each is willing to incur a fixed cost (F) to obtain a marginal return of
(l+. In the state of pessimism, other agents do not frequent the intermediary and the
representative agent does not either thus avoiding the (large) fixed cost of operating the
intermediat.on process alone and earning a lower marginal return of (1 +rJ. As discussed
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below, this model thus rests on the existence of multiple equilibria for each point in the
capital state space. In one equilibrium, participation at the intermediary is high and at the
other intenrediation is absent.
To establish the existence of sunspot equilibria through (7) two conditions must be
met. First, there must be a solution (a function V(K,O)) that satisfies the functional equation,
(7). Second, we must demonstrate that for all values of the capital stock K in the relevant
state space, there exists an indeterminacy about the form of intermediation that the realization
of U resolves. We summarize our findings in the following two propositions.
Proposition 1: There exists a V(K,9) that satisfies (7) for KEx.
PropositIon 2: There exists a value of F such that an equilibrium exists with
for KEx.
Proofs of these propositions are in the appendix. Note that these propositions hold
for the capital stock in the set K. As argued in the proofs, the set K is the interval of capital
stocks that lie between the steady state associated with permanent pessimism (K,) and the
highest obtainable capital stock under optimism (K,,)? To verify the second proposition, we
set F so that at K=K, the representative agent is indifferent between accumulating through
the intermediary and utilizing the non-intermediated technique to obtain K, in the following
period. Since the desired capital stock is increasing in K, this implies that for K> K,, the
representative lender will prefer the intermediary when all others save in that fashion as well.
Thus the optimistic equilibrium always exists. The pessimistic equilibrium always exists as
"Thesen.iablea.n dermed pieci.ely in theappendixand we pove. in an addidonal pvopoaiuon. that if the capiul flock is in the set
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long as the cost of operating the intermediary by a single agent is, as we assume, prohibitive.
Given these propositions, the quantitan characteristics of the economy are
determined by the two policy functions which map from the state, (K,9) into the future
capital stock and the current level of employment, K'(K,9) and n(K,9). There are three
important properties of these policy functions that are important for our simulations. First,
K'(K,O) is an increasing function of K given 0. This reflects consumption smoothing and is
the underlying property of the neoclassical model that generates convergence. Further, the
desired capital stock is higher in states of optimism: i.e.K'(K,0J >K'(K,0) for all K E .
Second,for the preferences we specify, n(K,0) is decreasing in K and increasing in 0. The
first effect, described above and in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988], reflects wealth effects
and response to interest rates as the capital stock varies. Finally, as noted above, K'(K,OJ
and K'(K,0) lie between the policy functions thatcharacterizethe capital accumulation
process for the two extreme economies in which O=9 for all t and the other in which 9=0,,
for all t. We use this property to characterize the sunspot equilibria.
From these two policy functions, all other variables of interest for the representative
household (and thus for the macro economy) are determined. In particular, the production
function determines the level of output, the resource constraint determines consumption from
investment and output. In addition, given an initial stock of capital one can calculate a
capital stock series in exactly the same manner as done for U.S. data. This allows us to
address the implications of our model for the relative volatility of capital without an
measurement problems.
In addition, there are two interest rates that can be determined. One is the return onthe marginal unit of investment: the marginal product of the capital which the investment
produces plus the undepreciated increment to tnt capital stock, R.M Second, there is the
interest rate on deposits that a competitive intermediary would offer per unit invested, ?.
Fromthe intermediary's liquidation constraint, r=(1-(F/l))R for a current investment level
of I. Note that the cyclical behavior of P. reflects, among other things, variations in the
marginal pioduct of capital. Further, the behavior of r4 reflects not just that of R but also
the size of the fixed cost relative to the amount of investment that is being undertaken. As
we shall see, this implies that the correlation of R and rmayin fact be negative.
For common variables, the paranieterization of the model is close to that of King,
Plosser and RebeloY The critical variables are the returns on investment in the two states
and the fixed cost. As discussed earlier, we set F so that at K, the representative agent is
indifferent between the two techniques of producing future capital. We set [=0 and i=.03
and assume that Prob{8,+1=O0IO=O,}Prob{O,.iO,IQ6}.9 implying a considerable
amount of persistence in the sunspot process. Numerically, the method of value function
iteration converg& to a value function which solves (7)26
The results from this exercise are given in Table 3 and Figures 2 and 3. Table 3
provides a summary of the behavior of some of the key macroeconomic variables in our
economy. The statistics in Table 3 were computed from a 2000 period simulation of the
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economywhile the paths given in Figures 2 and 3 represent a subperiod of the simulation."
As with the model investigated in the previous section, it is still the case that large
variations in the capital stock lie at the heart of our results. The standard deviation of the
capital stock relative to output is 4.3, still well above the observed ratio of standard
deviations.As noted above, we cancalculate the capital stock series using the initial value,
the assumed rate of depreciation and the simulated level of investment as if they were no
shocks to the intermediation process: i.e. we can replicate the calculation used to construct
the measure of the U.S. capital stock. Even for this alternative capital series, we find that
the standard deviation of the capital stock far exceeds that of output.
In contrast to the previous model of real intermediation shocks, both consumption
and investment are positively correlated with output and the relative volatilities are in accord
with observed U.S. macroeconomic behavior: consumption is less volatile than output while
investment is more volatile. Note too that in this model labor is positively correlated with
output: when there is a change in regime, both output and employment move in the same
direction and this effect dominates. Thus this model does a better job of matching observed
patterns of correlations from U.S. data.
Figures 2 and 3 display the outcome of the simulation of the economy that underlies
the statistics reported in Table 3•21 These figures play a similar role as the impulse response
function for the earlier model in that intuition about the behavior of this economy is best
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developedthrough them. From Figure 2, note the response of the economy to a change in
regime shown in period 30. When a pessimistic sunspot occurs (the sunspot variable equals
0 in Figure 2), agents do not save through the intermediary and the economy begins to move
toward the pessimistic steady state. Along this transition path, the capital stock is falling
along with outputandconsumption.
In terms of financial variables, recall that there are two variables of interest: the
marginal product of an additional unit of investment (R) and the return to deposits (rd). For
our economy we find that there is a positive correlation between R and y. In the initial
period of optimism, output expands and the return to investment increases as well. Within
the optimism regime, the economy accumulates capital so that output increases while R falls.
The positive correlation reflects the dominant effect associated with the change in regime.
Figure 3 outlines the behavior of interest rates. At the time of the pessimistic shock,
the marginal efficiency of investment falls, implying that R falls as well in period 30.
However, the reduction in the capital stock that follows leads R to rise during the transition.
For our economy, the fall in both output and R that occurs at impact dominates in
determining the positive correlation between these two variables. In contrast, the correlation
between output and the deposit rate is negative. This is due to the fact that when a period of
pessimism begins, the decrease in R is not reflected in dsincethe end of the intermediation
process implies that the fixed cost of intermediation is not incurred. As a consequence,
deposit rates do not decrease to the extend that R does though deposit rates do rise, along
with R, during the capital deaccumulation process. Overall then there is a negative
correlation observed between deposits rates and output.26
Tothe extent that real interest rates on relatively safe investments (which is our
interpretation of the alternative to the intermediation process) were quite high during the
Depression, this is in accord with observation. Further, during periods of pessimism, a gap
does emerge. Considerthe returnthat could have been obtained in the event that the
intermediation process was in fact utilized? .\s our economy is extreme in that
intermediation ceases in the event of pessimism, there is actually no investment taking place
at this higher rate. In reality, there was intermediated investment during the Depression
period (i.e. not all banks closed) which could be measured by the yield on corporate debt.
We interpret the rate of return from the (non-functioning) intermediation process as a proxy
for the return on this activity. Given this, one can construct the differential between the
return on intermediated and non-intermediated investment. This gap is positive during a
period of pessimism reflecting the relatively high yield projects that go unfunded due to the
breakdown of the intermediation process.
Contrasting the two economies, recall that in the model with fundamental shocks,
consumption smoothing was not observed and consumption was negatively correlated with
investment. In contrast, for the sunspot economy, there is consumption smoothing. Further,
in the fIrst economy, employment was negatively correlated with output while in the second,
it was positively correlated with output. These differences seem to stem from two sources.
First, the real deposit rate is countercyclical in the second economy but strongly
procyclical in the first. Thus the response of labor supply and consumption to variations in
real returns is one factor that might distinguish the two economies. In fact, if we simulate
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thesecond economy allowing for regimes changes but assuming a zero fixed cost of
intermediation, employment is again countercyclical and the deposit rate is procyclical.
Further, without the fixed cost of intermediation, consumption smoothing disappears. Thus
the presence of the fixed cost, which underlies the multiplicity of stage game equilibria, has
implications for the behavior of interest rates and thus employment and consumption.
Second, the pattern of correlations reported in Table 3 reflects the shifts in regimes as
well as variations within a regime. This nonlinearity may also be imporunt in distinguishing
the two economies. To investigate this point, Table 4 presents the regime contingent
correlations from the simulations while Figure 4 shows the simulated series for investment,
along with consumption and output.'° Comparing these results with those in Table 3, note
that within each regime, both investment and employment are negatively correlated with
output. Thus the positive correlation of these variables with output for the overall simulation
is a consequence of their behavior across regimes. Further, within regimes, consumption
smoothing disappears as both investment and consumption are more volatile than output.
Thus, the economy driven by sunspots has many of the same statistical properties of the first
economy once one conditions on regime. This is perhaps not too surprising given that the
pattern of correlations is largely driven by the neoclassical adjustment process, contingent on
a regime in the case of the second economy.
To what extent are the statistics reported for our model economy a consequence of the
fact that both new investment and undepreciated capita] are assumed to go through the
intermediation process? To address this issue, consider a variation on the basic model such
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thatonly savings out of cunentoutput passesthrough the intermediation process. That is,
instead of (3) suppose that
=K/l—8)+J,O,.
Using this accumulation equation in the dynamic programming problem, we can follow the
steps taken for the previous model." The resulting statistics for the overall sample are given
in Table S. Comparing these with those repoi'4 in Table 3, the same basic patterns of
behavior emerge. Also, for this economy the ratio of the standard deviation of capital to that
of output is 3.76. Thus our earlier findings appear robust to altering the specification so that
only new investment is intermediated.
IV. Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to provide a quantitative assessment of models in which
variations in the process of intermediation play a central role in aggregate fluctuations. This
was accomplished by looking at two somewhat different models. The first attempts to
capture the spirit of a number of models which focus on variations in the cost of creating
new capital due to disruptions in the intermediation process. To study this, we introduced
intermediation shocks into an otherwise standard real business cycle model. The results from
this exercise were: (1) investment was not positively conelated with output, (ii) consumption
was more volatile than output and (iii) the capital stock was more volatile than output. In
these three respects, the behavior of the model economy is at variance with observed
aggregate fluctuations. Further, interest rates and output were strongly positively correlated,
Sine. wedo n ploY.Propo.ifiou I and 2 forth;. em4romnenl, the c.utiou. reader thould thk.k o( tM. czeni.enexploring the
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incontrast to observadon.
The second model introduced financial fragility through extraneous uncertainty which
influenced the perceived return to saving through an intermediary. As in Bryant and Weil,
multiple equilibria arise in the static interaction between savers in their choice of technique
for converting goods today into capital tomorrow. This indeterminacy was resolved using a
sunspots approach and the quantitative features of the resulting economy evaluated. This
economy exhibits large fluctuations and is best interpreted as a model of the Depression
period in which the process of intermediation was almost shutdown.
As in the case of the model with real intermediation shocks, the capital stock was
quite volatile. However, in the model with extrinsic uncertainty, consumption smoothing
was evident and both consumption and investment were positively correlated with output.
Furthermore, due to the presence of fixed costs in the intermediation process, deposit rates
werenegatively correlated with output, as observed during the Great Depression.
From these results, it appears that the behavior of both economies are driven by the
effects of the returns from the intermediation process on the capital stock. The economies
had different implications for correlations across macroeconomic variables due to the
presence of fixed costs aM nonlinearities in the sunspot economy.
In our analysis, we do not derive a series of intermediation shocks from observables.
While it seems possible to use the errors from an Euler equation to generate an
intermediation shock series, the identification assumptions necessary for such an exercise
seem quite strong. Instead, we plan to study particular historical episodes in some detail,
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such as the banking crisis during the Great Depression, to evaluate the implications of our
model relative to U.S. experience.
Two other exercises are motivated by our findings. First, the intermediation process
modeled here has no direct implications for the cost of borrowing to obtain consumption
goods. Yet, purchases of durables are an important aspect of variations in the intermediation
process and the model should be expandedtoinclude this feature. In fact, Romer [1990]
finds that at the lime of the onset of the Depression purchases of consumer durables fell
while purchases of some non-durable actually rose. Perhaps this reflects the fact that many
consumer durable purchases (e.g. cars) were financed and hence were subject to
intermediation shocks.
Second, the financial fragility model can be used to evaluate the gains to financial
reform and stabilization. One interpretation of the period since the Depression is that
financial reforms (most notably deposit insurance) have eliminated some of the strategic
uncertainty over intermediated investment, In principle, one could use a more carefully
calibrated version of our model to evaluate the welfre gains from this type of intervention.33
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Appendix: Proof,
As discussed in the text, x[Iç,KJ. MercK, is the unique steady stale level of capital for the
economy with perpetual pessimism. It is determined from the two first order conditions to the accumulation
problem: the intritemporal first-order condition and the Euler equation at the steady state values for employment
and the capiI.l stock. K is the largest value of K that satisfies: K=(flC,l)P)(1+r)/(l.(l.1)(1+o). Thus it
represents the highest level of the capital stock that can be reproduced if the agent has zero leisure and zero
consumption.
Proposition 1: There exists a VQC,9) that satisfies (7) for KEc.
Proof: The proof uses Proposition 9.6 from Stokey-Lucas (19891. To make use of their result, we note that
the return function is bounded and continuous for KEc, the feasible set is non-empty, compact valued and
continuous and that our problem has discounting.
Proposition 2: There exists a value ofF such that an equilibrium exists with v(K.OJv(K,9,) for all KEr.
Proof LetK fori—o,pbethesteady statelevelofcapitai stockiftheeconomywas instate81inall periods
with certainty. From the steady state of the Euler equation, it is easy to see that I>K,. Choose F so that at
K-K,. the cost to the agent of obtaining K,of capital tomorrow is the same whether the accumulation is
through the intennediary (assuming that all other agents are going to the intermediary) or through the non-
intermediated technology. Thus, F satisfies:
F=FaK(
I
—I, (Al) ' (l+)(1+)
So at K=K,, the returns to intermediated accumulation are at least as large as non-intermediated accumulation
as the agent could choose a capital stock not equal to K.,through intermediated investment and thus be no wont
off.ForK> K, and this value of F, it is clear that the intermediated technology is more efficient than the non-
intermediated one. Thus, if all other agents go to the intermediary for K>K,, the remaining agent will do so as
well.Hence for each K>K,, there is always an optimistic equilibrium. Further, as long as the fixed cost to
intermediation is sufficiently large, if all other agents accumulate using the non-intermediated technology, the
remaining agent will not have an incentive to use the intermediated accumulation process.
Proposition 3: If F-p, then K'(K',9)￿K, and for all 9.
Proof: To see that X'QC',O)￿K, for all 8, suppose that K'(K,8)cIç. Given that F=K, the agent will then
accumulate capital using the mattress technology. Since K, is the steady state of the economy with perpetual
pessimism, the agent could have done no worse by setti'' K'(K',8)=K,. In a similar way, suppose that
K'(K',0j<K,, Again, from F=F, the best to accumu ?3 is through the mattress. Once again, the capital is
below K, and the welfare of the agent, by revealed preference, cannot exceed that from remaining at K, and
using the mattress accumulation technology. Thus, K'(K',6)￿K, for all 0.
To see that K'&..o)￿çforafl 8, note that it is feasible to remain at the capital stock K when 6"0,
but it is not feasible to have K> K under optimism as then consumption would be negative. Given that the
maximal capital stock is higher under perpetual optimism than under perpetual pessimism, K,>K,. So, using
the fact that F-p, we know that the mattress is a less efficient storage technology at K so that under
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